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Armed robbery. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Williams.
JORDAN, Justice.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to withdraw his "guilty" plea after sentence had been pronounced.
Y. C. Thomas, appellant in this case was indicted by a Fulton County Grand Jury for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and the possession and concealment of a pistol. On October 2, 1972, appellant pled guilty to all charges brought against him and the trial judge pronounced sentence on the same day. On May 7, 1973, more than seven months after sentence was entered appellant filed a pro se motion captioned "Motion To Vacate Guilty Plea." On May 24, 1973, the trial judge considered said pleading along with the original transcript at the hearing on entry of the guilty pleas and found that said pleas were freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made without undue influence or promise of leniency, and that when they were entered the defendant had a full understanding of his constitutional rights, and that they were entered with the assistance of and in the presence of his counsel. In the light of these findings the trial judge denied appellant's motion. A motion for rehearing was filed in the Fulton Superior Court claiming that the denial of the motion was contrary to the law and evidence. The trial judge denied appellant's second motion, and appellant appeals from these rulings.
Code 27-1404 provides that an accused has the right to withdraw a plea of guilty at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence by the trial judge. The appellant at no time prior to the pronouncement of sentence requested the withdrawal of his guilty plea although the record indicates there was ample opportunity to do so.
After the pronouncement of sentence a ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court, said discretion not to be disturbed on the appellate level unless manifestly abused. Smith v. State, 231 Ga. 23; Marshall v. State, 128 Ga. App. 413 (197 SE2d 161); McCrary v. State, 215 Ga. 887 (2) (114 SE2d 133); Farmer v. State, 128 Ga. App. 416 (196 SE2d 893); Ware v. State, 128 Ga. App. 407 (196 SE2d 896). It appears from the record that appellant here was informed of every right available to him under the Constitution, and that every effort was made to insure that appellant fully understood these rights. There was no abuse of discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or his motion for a rehearing. The evidence amply supports a finding that appellant entered his plea of guilty knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Morris H. Rosenberg, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General Courtney Wilder Stanton, David L. G. King Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Y. C. Thomas, pro se.
Friday May 22 14:17 EDT

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