Defendant appeals following his conviction for felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Rufus Gordon Smith. 1
The facts are set out fully in Williams v. State, 267 Ga. 771 (482 SE2d 288) (1997)
. We summarize them briefly as follows:
Defendant and several other young men (including Ronald Vashon Williams and Kevin Echols) beat the victim, an elderly homeless man, and knocked him to the ground. The victim was lying face down on the ground when defendant drew a gun and shot him in the neck. Defendant subsequently bragged to two acquaintances that he shot the victim.
1. The evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants because their defenses were antagonistic. "The mere fact that co-defendants' defenses are antagonistic is not sufficient in itself to warrant separate trials. [Cit.] A showing of harm is necessary. [Cit.]" Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128
, 129 (218 SE2d 856
) (1975). Defendant claims he was harmed by the trial court's failure to sever because, although the trial court redacted custodial statements made by the co-defendants, the jury heard two bits of information stemming from those statements. 2
We disagree. Defendant moved for a mistrial with regard to one of the statements; and he interposed an objection with regard to the other. In each instance, the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard what they had heard. If the trial court's curative instructions were not sufficient, defendant should have sought additional relief. Absent any such motion or request by defendant, it cannot be said that he was harmed by the information concerning the custodial statements. See Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580 (439 SE2d 471) (1993)
; Smith v. State, 261 Ga. 512 (407 SE2d 732) (1991)
Defendant has not shown any prejudice to his case which could have been avoided by severing his trial. It follows that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to sever. Gee v. State, 261 Ga. 178 (3) (402 SE2d 719) (1991)
3. Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to disqualify Williams' counsel because he initially represented both Williams and Jasper Glass, a suspect who ultimately became a prosecution witness. This contention is without merit. We held in Williams v. State, supra at (3), that Williams' counsel's representation of Williams and Glass did not constitute a conflict of interest. Moreover, insofar as this appeal is concerned, defendant failed to demonstrate how he was harmed by any purported conflict. 3
Whether an attorney should be disqualified from representing a client rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Redd v. State, 264 Ga. 399
, 401 (444 SE2d 776
) (1994); Clos v. Pugia, 204 Ga. App. 843
, 845 (420 SE2d 774
) (1992). It cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify Williams' counsel.
4. The trial court's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant was not clearly erroneous. See Williams, supra at (4).
5. Defendant's assertion that the trial court should have charged the jury concerning his "misidentification" defense is without merit. "This court has previously held that there is no requirement of our law that a trial judge warn the jury against the possible dangers of mistaken identification of an accused as the person committing a crime. Micheli v. State, 222 Ga. 361 (149 SE2d 803)
[(1966)]." Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553
, 557 (7) (176 SE2d 52
Paul L. Howard, District Attorney, Gina C. Marshall, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.