lawskills
Loading
Did you know you can download our entire database for free?


Resources
[more] 

Georgia Caselaw:
Browse
Greatest Hits

Georgia Code: Browse

(external) Findlaw Georgia Law Resources


This site exists because of donors like you.

Thanks!


Lawskills.com Georgia Caselaw
EUBANKS et al. v. THE STATE.
21479.
Burning to defraud insurer; constitutional question. Mitchell Superior Court. Before Judge Crow.
HEAD, Presiding Justice.
1. An indictment which charges a defendant with the commission of a crime in the language of a valid statute is sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the charge against him.
2. The act of 1949 (Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1118-1122) is not unconstitutional and void as contended by the defendants.
John Robert Eubanks and Jim Roger Ricks were indicted under the act of 1949 (Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1118-1122; Code Ann. 26-2213) and charged with "the offense of Burning to Defraud Insurer." Their demurrer to the indictment was overruled, and the exception is to this judgment.
1. The indictment charged the defendants with the crime of "burning to defraud insurer" in the language of the act, and the first ground of demurrer, asserting that the indictment fails to charge the defendants "with the commission of a crime," can not be sustained, unless it be determined that the act of 1949 is unconstitutional and void as contended in grounds 2 and 3 of the demurrer.
In ground 4 of the demurrer it is asserted that the indictment fails to allege who was the owner of the automobile. In ground 5 it is asserted that it fails to allege the number of the insurance policy, the date it was issued, and in whose name the policy was issued. In ground 6 it is asserted that the indictment does not allege payment of the premium and that the policy was in full force and effect at the time the automobile was destroyed by fire, and in ground 7 it is asserted that no loss is shown to have been suffered by the insurance company.
2. In ground 2 of the demurrer it is contended that the act of 1949 (Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1118-1122) is unconstitutional and void as being in violation of Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. VIII (Code Ann. 2-1908) of the Constitution, "in that said act refers to more than one subject matter and contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the 1949 act is as follows: "An Act to repeal Sections 26-2208, 26-2209, 26-2210 and 26-2211, relating to the crime of arson and the punishment therefor, and to enact other sections relating to said crime or the attempt thereat and prescribing the punishment therefor; and to enact other laws relating to the kindling of fire on one's land or that of another and prescribing the punishment therefor; and for other purposes."
The only crime mentioned in the title of the 1949 act is arson. Notice is given of the repeal of certain sections and of the intention "to enact other sections relating to said crime." This language is sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. VIII (Code Ann. 2-1908) of the Constitution. The general object of the law is all that need be indicated by the title or caption of the act, and a synopsis of the law is not required to be in the title. White v. Donaldson, 170 Ga. 432, 436 (153 SE 19); Morgan v. Shepherd, 171 Ga. 33, 37 (154 SE 780); Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 138 (60 SE2d 763); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 214 Ga. 232, 236 (104 SE2d 208).
"Provisions germane to the general subject-matter embraced in the title of an act, and which are designed to carry into effect the purpose for which it was passed, may be constitutionally enacted therein, though not referred to in the title otherwise than by the use of the words 'and for other purposes.' " Burns v. State, 104 Ga. 544 (1) (30 SE 815); Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21 (50 AD) 306); Branson v. Long, 159 Ga. 288, 293 (125 SE 500); Inter-City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 390, 394 (157 SE 673); Black v. Jones, 190 Ga. 95, 97 (8 SE2d 385).
The Sections of the Code repealed by the 1949 act are Sections appearing in the official Code of 1933. In the absence of specific language naming some other Code, the act of 1949 can only refer to the official Code of 1933, since it is the only Code of full force and effect in this State.
Maston O'Neal, Solicitor-General, contra.
Twitty & Twitty, Frank S. Twitty, Jr., for plaintiffs in error.
SUBMITTED JANUARY 8, 1962 -- DECIDED FEBRUARY 8, 1962.
Friday May 22 22:49 EDT


This site exists because of donors like you.

Thanks!


Valid HTML 4.0!

Valid CSS!





Home - Tour - Disclaimer - Privacy - Contact Us
Copyright © 2000,2002,2004 Lawskills.com