1. While the act of the General Assembly approved March 6, 1956 (Ga. L. 1956, p. 405), amends Code (Ann.) 30-101 so as to remove the provisions relative to a decree granting a total divorce not becoming final until the expiration of 30 days from the granting of the decree, and eliminates the provision requiring the filing of a proper written petition to modify or set aside the verdict within thirty days from the rendition and entering thereof--thus, in effect, on and after the date of the passage of the act, providing for the filing of a motion for new trial in such cases (Code 102-104; Maynard v. Marshall, 91 Ga. 840 (2)
, 18 S. E. 403; Home Insurance Co. v. Willis, 179 Ga. 509
(1c), 176 S. E. 371; Anthony v. Penn, 212 Ga. 292
, 92 S. E. 2d 14) where, as in this case, on October 11, 1955, a divorce is granted by the jury with an award of permanent alimony, upon which a judgment is entered accordingly the same day, with an award of attorney fees, and no written petition to modify or set aside the verdict and judgment is filed within 3 days thereafter, as provided by the statute (Code, Ann., 30-101; Ga. L. 1946, pp. 90, 91), the verdict and judgment become final and conclusive; and this is true in the instant case notwithstanding the fact that the defendant husband, on November 9, 1955, during the 30-day period immediately subsequent to the date of the verdict and judgment, filed a motion for new trial upon the usual general grounds, which was later amended by adding one ground based on newly discovered evidence, there being, under such circumstances, no authority in law for the filing of a motion for new trial during that period. Neal v. Neal, 209 Ga. 199
(71 S. E. 2d 229); Branch v. Branch, 211 Ga. 22
(83 S. E. 2d 601).