Carlos Raynald Freeman was charged by accusation with reckless driving and not wearing a seat belt. He was convicted of both charges after a bench trial. He now appeals from the judgment and sentence entered thereon, enumerating only the conviction for reckless driving.
Freeman contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the accusation as invalid for failing to allege that Freeman was driving recklessly in disregard for the safety of persons or property. We find Freeman's contention completely without merit, and we affirm the judgment below.
We note briefly that although the gist of Freeman's contention is that the accusation omitted the essential element of disregard for the safety of persons or property, OCGA 17-7-71
(c) provides that an accusation is sufficient either when it tracks the statutory language or when it is worded "so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood" by the factfinder. This accusation charged Freeman with "unlawfully driv[ing] a motor vehicle on a public road in a reckless manner." This was so plain that the nature of the charged offense was easily understood.