Appellant-plaintiffs brought suit, seeking to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from a vehicular collision. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of appellee-defendants. Appellants appeal from the judgment entered by the trial court on the jury's verdict and enumerate as error only the trial court's giving of a charge on the principle of legal accident.
1. Appellants urge that the giving of a charge on legal accident should no longer be sanctioned.
Although it has been recognized that a charge on legal accident is potentially confusing and misleading to juries and is redundant of the general principles of negligence law, "Georgia has not discarded accident as a proper subject for jury instructions. . . . [Cit.]" Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338
, 342 (1) (312 SE2d 835
) (1983). Even assuming that the abolition of the giving of a charge on legal accident is not a matter solely for the Georgia Supreme Court (but see Savannah Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 559
, 562 (4) (64 SE 680
) (1909)), it is clear that a majority of this court as presently constituted is not so inclined. See Smoky, Inc. v. McCray, 196 Ga. App. 650
, 652 (5) (396 SE2d 794
2. Appellant also urges that a charge on legal accident was not authorized by the evidence. "A review of the record shows that there was . . . evidence which would have authorized the jury to find that, notwithstanding appellee[-driver]'s exercise of ordinary reasonable care, he lost control of his [vehicle] on the rain-slick highway [at a point where water was pouring across the road due to insufficient drainage], hydroplaned into the lane of on-coming traffic and struck the vehicle that was being operated by appellant[-driver]. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving a charge on the defense of legal accident. [Cit.]" Whitehead v. Coffey, 198 Ga. App. 587 (402 SE2d 311) (1991)
. See also Jump v. Benefield, 193 Ga. App. 612
, 614-615 (2) (388 SE2d 864
) (1989); Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83
, 87 (2) (318 SE2d 700
) (1984). Appellee-driver's guilty plea to driving too fast for conditions "did not constitute an irrebuttable admission that the collision was the proximate result of negligence on [his] part, [cit.] . . ." Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (1) (364 SE2d 49) (1987)
. See also Peacock v. Strickland, 198 Ga. App. 406 (1) (401 SE2d 601) (1991)
; Williams v. Calhoun, 175 Ga. App. 332 (333 SE2d 408) (1985)