Among the findings made by the trial court in its order denying Goode's petition for habeas corpus is that Goode had waived extradition to Colorado. Support for that finding is found in a document signed by Goode in which he requested that he be permitted to be supervised as a probationer in Georgia. In that document appears the following sentence: "I hereby waive extradition to the sending state from any state of the United States and also agree that I will not contest any effort by any jurisdiction to return me to the sending state." Goode does not contest the fact that he signed the waiver of extradition, but contends the waiver is ineffective because it was not voluntary in that the alternative to signing the waiver was to be held hostage by the State of Colorado.
Goode was not a hostage held by the State of Colorado, but was instead a person convicted of a crime in that State who was permitted as a matter of the grace of that State to serve his sentence on probation rather than in prison. Gehl v. People, 161 Colo. 535, 539 (423 P2d 332) (1967). Georgia, too, views probation as a matter of grace, upon the granting of which conditions may be imposed.
"[A] person occupies a special status while on probation, during which time his private life and behavior may be regulated by the State to an extent that would be completely untenable under ordinary circumstances. The rationale for this power is basically, of course, that the person has been convicted of a crime and would be serving a sentence but for the grace of the court." [Cit.]
Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597
, 599 (505 SE2d 491
) (1998). When the grace Colorado had granted Goode was extended to permit him to serve his period of probation in his home state, it required from him the reciprocal promise that he would return without protest to Colorado in the event he was summoned there. We do not agree with Goode that his promise to return was involuntary because he could not have returned to Georgia had he not given it.
In some instances a condition of probation involves a waiver of a defendant's rights including those protected by state or federal constitutions. However, the conditions of probation are not imposed involuntarily, but are accepted by convicted criminals as a condition necessary to avoid incarceration in the penitentiary. [Cit.] Whether the waiver of rights required under the condition of probation amounts to an abuse of discretion depends upon whether it is "related to a legitimate purpose underlying the criminal justice system . . . [or whether defendant's] loss of rights relates in a rational way to the purpose underlying the sentencing objective, to prevent his involvement in criminal activity by monitoring his conduct while he serves the probationary part of his sentence." [Cits.]
We consider for the first time in this case whether a waiver of extradition may validly be imposed as a condition under which probation is granted or modified favorably to the probationer. That the waiver is " 'related to a legitimate purpose underlying the criminal justice system' " (Tuttle, supra at (2)) is beyond question in that the state granting probation has an undeniable interest in recalling a probationer to answer to allegations that the probationer has violated the terms of probation. We also note that our General Assembly has obviously concluded that such waivers are valid since it has expressly provided for such waivers as a condition of probation. OCGA 42-8-35
(12). Thus, the waiver is cloaked with the presumption of validity that accompanies all legislation. See Williams v. Ragsdale, 205 Ga. 274
, 277 (53 SE2d 339
) (1949) ("A statute is presumed to be valid and constitutional until the contrary appears . . . ."). Courts in other states have found such waivers valid. People v. Velarde, 739 P2d 845, 849 (Colo. 1987) (parole); State v. Maglio, 189 N.J. Super. 257 (459 A2d 1209) (1983); White v. Hall, 15 Md. App. 446 (291 A2d 694) (1972); Schwartz v. Woodahl, 157 Mont. 479 (487 P2d 300) (1971); Swyston v. Hedman, 288 Minn. 530 (179 NW2d 282) (1970); Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash.2d 52 (195 P2d 112) (1948).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a waiver of extradition as a condition of probation, and by extension, as a condition of a modification of probation favorable to the probationer, is valid. Accordingly, the trial court's finding of the waiver's validity is affirmed. That being so, issues regarding extradition are moot since proof of the waiver, of Goode's identity, and of Colorado's desire for his return sufficed to authorize the trial court to order the surrender of Goode to Colorado.
Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, James S. Archer, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.