After pleading guilty to burglary, Renee Fewox and Cherie Stegall appeal the trial court's order requiring them to pay $3,405 in restitution to the victims of their crime, Sean and Charlotte Tomlinson. The appellants contend that the trial court inappropriately based its determination on the replacement cost of the items stolen rather than fair market value. For the reasons discussed below, we agree and remand the case for further consideration.
Under OCGA 17-14-9
, "(t)he amount of restitution ordered may be equal to or less than, but not more than, the victim's damages," which are further defined in OCGA 17-14-2
(2) as "all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action . . . based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced. . . ." "Thus(,) the sufficiency of evidence to support an order of restitution should be measured by the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence." Lawrenz v. State, 194 Ga. App. 724
, 725 (391 SE2d 703
At the restitution hearing in this case, the State called the Tomlinsons to testify regarding the property that had been taken from their home and the value of that property. During their examination, the Tomlinsons stated that the values which they were giving represented the replacement cost for the stolen property, except for a collection of compact discs for which the Tomlinsons calculated an average per disc worth based on their resale values. Therefore, with the exception of the collection of compact discs, the order of restitution was improperly based on replacement cost for the property. Gaskin, supra. As such, we must vacate the order of restitution and remand the case for further hearings to determine the fair market value of the stolen property. Id.
The State's reliance on Maddox v. State, 157 Ga. App. 696 (278 SE2d 480) (1981)
does not change this result. In Maddox, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by permitting the victim, whose home had been burglarized,
to testify as to her opinion of the value of an item without giving the basis for the formulation of that opinion, and that the trial court erred in permitting [the victim as a] lay witness to prove the alleged value of an item by the hearsay statement of a non-expert witness.
Id. We rejected the defendant's contentions, finding that the owner of property is qualified to give testimony as to its value and that, "especially where an owner of stolen property is attempting to establish value for purposes of restitution by the thief . . . the question of whether [the owner] has given sufficient foundation  should be left to the trier of fact." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 697. Thus, Maddox dealt specifically with the ability of a victim of theft to testify regarding the value of stolen property. There was no contention in Maddox, however, that the restitution order therein was based on replacement rather than fair market value, and, as such, that opinion bears no application to the issue now before us.