1  The Supreme Court reversed this Court's ruling in Smith on other grounds, which does not affect the principle applied in this case. 238 Ga. 559 (234 SE2d 24) (1977). App. 363) APRIL TERM, 1996. 365 Consideration and determination of whether a new trial should be granted. When that is ruled on, another appeal could follow. All of the delaying and expensive shuffling back and forth is precluded by the simple expedient of deciding both motions at once. See Speer, supra. When the Speer case returned, we ruled, predictably, that we were compelled to affirm the grant of j.n.o.v. even though it was ordered solely on a question of law. Speer v. Gemco Elevator Co., 136 Ga. App. 235 (220 SE2d 714) (1975).Ruling on both alternatives at the same time also promotes a decision when the content of the trial is most fresh in the trial court's mind. That court has a broad discretion to grant a new trial on the general grounds, OCGA 5-5-50, and we cannot assume that its discretion was exercised in this case and that it denied the motion sub silentio. Only general grounds provided in OCGA 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 were urged. Appellate review of rulings on such grounds is very limited, but there must be assurance that the discretion was exercised. Ricketts v. Williams, 240 Ga. 148 (240 SE2d 41) (1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U. S. 902 (98 SC 3118, 57 LE2d 1145) (1978). The trial courts, on the other hand, have a duty which carries with it a commensurate power far greater than that accorded to the appellate courts. "Ours is a function merely to see that the law is followed. Theirs is the solemn responsibility to see to it that justice is administered according to the evidence as well as the law." Mills v. State, 188 Ga. 616, 623 (4 SE2d 453) (1939).It was peculiarly important for the trial judge to have ruled on both motions in this case, because she has been appointed to the superior court in the interim. Of course, when the case is remanded, the two courts could arrange for her to rule on the motions as a matter of expediency, due to her unique familiarity with the case. OCGA 15-1-9.1.Navistar had argued to the trial court that the dicta in Housing Auth. &c. of Atlanta v. Van Geter, 252 Ga. 196 (312 SE2d 309) (1984), means Ogletree's appeal did not act as supersedeas for the narrow purpose of deciding the motion for new trial, so that the trial court could rule on the motion without the appeal being remanded. In Van Geter the Supreme Court decided "the unique question of the effect of a notice of appeal upon a subsequent motion for new trial which is filed within the statutory period," and held: "In the event a motion for new trial is timely filed . . . the effectiveness of the divestiture of jurisdiction is then delayed until the motion for new trial is ruled upon and a notice of appeal to the ruling has been filed or the period for appealing the ruling has expired." Id. at 197. This holding only addresses instances where a motion for new trial has been filed after a notice of appeal, not cases involving OCGA 9-11-50 (c) (1), and its object is "to protect the integrity of the trial courts in their efforts to