This interlocutory appeal, transferred to us by the Court of Appeals, involves the question of venue where equitable relief is sought in conjunction with a boundary-line dispute and, less directly, the question of appellate jurisdiction in such a case.
The parties are owners of contiguous property in Crisp County. Beauchamp is a resident of Dougherty County. When Knight brought this action, Beauchamp moved it be transferred to the county of Beauchamp's residence on the ground that the case was essentially one in equity. The trial court held that Knight's claim, which sought removal of a fence and ejectment of Beauchamp from the disputed strip, was neither boundary-line nor equity but was an action respecting title to land. It held venue was properly in Crisp County, where the land is located, and denied the motion to transfer. Georgia Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. II. We reverse.
ipal court, or any federal court shall in any way affect or become a lien upon the title to real property until the judgment, decree, order, or writ of fieri facias is recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the real property is located and is entered in the indexes to the applicable records in the office of the clerk. Such entries and recordings must be requested and paid for by the plaintiff or the defendant, or his attorney at law. [Id.] 1. Because neither party contests the validity of the other's title, this is not a suit to establish title in a court of equity. Payne v. Terhune, 212 Ga. 169
, 170 (91 SE2d 348
) (1956); Dawson v. Altamaha Land Co., 215 Ga. 700
, 703 (113 SE2d 129
) (1960). Therefore venue was not in Crisp County, but in Dougherty County, and the motion to transfer should have been granted. Dougherty would be the proper forum whether the claim is, as Beauchamp contends, an equity case, or whether it is, as we perceive it, simply a boundary-line dispute. Georgia Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Pars. III and VI.
2. The Court of Appeals transferred this case to us on the ground that it was an equity case. Georgia Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. 111 (2) provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in "all equity cases." Whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal depends upon the issue raised on appeal, not upon how the case is styled nor upon the kinds of relief which may be sought by the complaint. That is, "equity cases" are those in which a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief sought in the superior court -- whether that relief was granted or denied. Cases in which the grant or denial of such relief was merely ancillary to underlying issues of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying issues of law were resolved, are not "equity cases."
The Court of Appeals long ago correctly assessed the rote invocation of jurisdictional words found in our constitution. (Relative to appeals which seek to raise the constitutional issue, see Fews v. State, 1 Ga. App. 122 (58 SE 64) (1907); Cox v. State, 19 Ga. App. 283 (91 SE 422) (1917).) "To hold that the Court of Appeals must lose jurisdiction over [such cases] . . . would be practically to enable any litigant . . . to select the appellate forum in which he might prefer his case to be determined." [Cit.]
See also Baranan v. Ga. State Bd. of Nursing Home Admrs., 239 Ga. 122
, 123 (236 SE2d 71
) (1977), which we transferred to the Court of Appeals, holding:
It is clear therefore that the injunction issue is one of mere form and that the substantive question on appeal is a legal question over which the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction.
There is no substantive issue of equity in this interlocutory appeal. In whatever context, the interlocutory issue of venue is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. 1
Boundary-line cases are likewise within the province of the Court of Appeals. Colley v. Dillon, 247 Ga. 4 (273 SE2d 606) (1981)
. Rarely does a boundary-line dispute exist in which equitable relief is not sought, but such relief is incidental to and secondary to the principal issue -- the location of the line.
For the reason stated in Division 1, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Culpepper, Pfeiffer & Harpe, Clifford W. Harpe, Jr., for appellees.