In 1965, appellant-plaintiff became a distributor of appellee-defendant's products. There was never a written agreement between the parties. The oral agreement was only that the relationship would continue for an indefinite period. In February of 1983, appellee informed appellant that the relationship would be terminated and, several months later, it was. Appellant then filed the instant action, alleging a wrongful termination of its distributorship. Appellee's motion for summary judgment was granted and appellant appeals.
"Generally, an agency is revocable at the will of the principal. . . . If, however, the power is coupled with an interest in the agent himself, it is not revocable at will. . . ." OCGA 10-6-33
. "In the absence of some contractual provision to the contrary, an agency for a . . . corporation to distribute its products in a certain territory for commissions would not be irrevocable as a power coupled with an interest merely because the agent expends time, efforts, and money to increase the business of the agency. [Cits.]" Wheeler v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 48 Ga. App. 378 (172 SE 826) (1933)
. Thus, in the instant case, "[a]ssuming that an agency was created for an indefinite time, it was revocable by the [appellee] at will inasmuch as it was not coupled with an interest. [Cit.]" Gunter Bros., Inc. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 87 Ga. App. 626
, 627 (74 SE2d 744
) (1953). Accordingly, the instant agency agreement "gives rise to no cause of action against the [appellee] for wrongful termination. [Cit.]" Elder v. Ivey, 171 Ga. App. 496
, 497 (320 SE2d 217
) (1984). See also Cannon v. Geneva Wheel & Stamping Corp., 172 Ga. App. 20 (322 SE2d 69) (1984)
; West Va. Glass Specialty Co. v. Guice & Walshe, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 556 (317 SE2d 592) (1984)
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee.
John R. Lowery, for appellee.