Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment, which motion was based on defendant's contention that due to legally deficient service of process, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the judgment. We reverse.
Appellant Greene contends that he was not personally served with a summons and complaint as required under Code Ann. 81A-104 (d) (7). Although appellant concedes that the Greene Agency Corporation was properly served as a party defendant (through appellant, as agent for the corporation), appellant contends that the plaintiff's failure to personally serve the defendant as an individual defendant precluded the court from entering judgment against him. We agree.
The only evidence relating to service of process on either appellant Greene or defendant Greene Agency Corporation (not a party to this appeal) is a return of service, which, as appellant points out, showed only that the corporation as a defendant had been served.
In the case at bar, there is no return of service for the defendant-appellant Greene. There is only return of service for defendant Greene Agency Corp ration. A return of service of process on another party defendant (Greene Agency Corp.) is not proof of proper service of process on defendant Greene, for whom there is no return of service. This being so, the court erred in denying appellant's motion to set aside.
Neither Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v. Stewart Bros., Inc., 139 Ga. App. 372 (1) (228 SE2d 586)
, nor Olvey v. C. & S. Bank of Clayton County, supra, compels a contrary result, since both cases involve irregularities in the return of service, not the "entire absence" of a return. Rielly v. Crook, 112 Ga. App. 334
, 336 (145 SE2d 110
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying appellant's motion to set aside must be reversed.