2. A motion to set aside a verdict on the ground that one of the jurors was not a resident of the county at the time of the trial raises an objection propter defectum, and arises too late after the verdict, through the movant did not know the fact alleged until after the verdict. Brown v. State, 105 Ga. 640 (1) (31 SE 557); Taylor v. Warren, 175 Ga. 800 (3) (166 SE 225); Tramell v. State, 183 Ga. 711 (5) (189 SE 529).
The appellee contends this rule should not be applied in the present case because counsel was misled by knowledge of the existence of a questionnaire sent by the court to all prospective jurors prior to the drawing of the panel for the term, in which questionnaire the juror had filled in the blank stating "6. Length of Residence in Catoosa County" with words "Approx. 15 years." This is not, of course, a statement that the prospective juror was a resident of Catoosa County at the time of the summons to jury duty, although it was doubtless intended by the maker of the form to be such. The stipulation of fact on which the new trial was granted states: "Two days [after rendition of this verdict] the juror was being questioned specifically as to his place of residence by counsel in another case and it was discovered that the juror was a resident of Walker County rather than Catoosa County." The same procedure might indubitably have been adopted in the case at bar, had appellee so desired.
The trial court erred in granting a new trial solely because one of the jurors was a nonresident of the county, no objection having been taken prior to verdict.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Richard L. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, F. H. Boney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.