The causal connection between an original act of negligence and injury to another is not broken by the "intervening" act of a third person, if the nature of such intervening act was such that it could reasonably have been anticipated or foreseen by the original wrongdoer.
The plaintiff (a defendant in error in this court) sued the defendants Reeve, Boykin, and Medlin (plaintiff in error in this court) alleging that the defendants' concurrent negligence caused her serious personal injuries and damages. According to the petition the plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk at a place where parking on the side of the street was prohibited by a city ordinance. Another city ordinance provided: "No vehicle shall so occupy any street so as to interfere with or interrupt the passage of other cars or vehicles." Medlin had parked her car with the front wheel against the curb and the back of the car about four feet out into the street, in violation of the ordinances. The car obstructed one-half of the right-hand lane as to traffic traveling northeasterly. Reeve was driving southwesterly, and his car was partially to the left of the center line of the street in violation of a city ordinance. Boykin was driving northeasterly with his automobile partially to the left of the center line of the street, also in violation of the ordinance requiring vehicles meeting and passing each other to keep to the right. Boykin swerved over into the left-hand traffic lane, as it was necessary for him to do in order to get around the Medlin car, and had gotten partially back into the right lane when the Boykin car and the Reeve car, still to its left of the center line, sideswiped with great force, causing the Boykin car to crash into the Medlin car and careen off the side and onto the sidewalk and into the plaintiff. The petition alleged numerous acts of negligence against each of the defendants in addition to violations of city ordinances. General demurrers of the defendants Reeve and Medlin were overruled by the trial court. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants Boykin and Medlin, and a verdict in favor of the defendant Reeve, and the court entered judgment accordingly.
The trial court denied defendant Medlin's motion for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and also denied the motion for new trial filed by the plaintiff against the defendant Reeve. The defendant Medlin assigns error on the judgments overruling her general demurrer, denying her motion for new trial, and denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdi et.
By cross-bill of exceptions the plaintiff assigns error on the denial of her motion for new trial as applied to the defendant Reeve.
App. 317, 321 (106 SE2d 325
). It is well settled that "One who himself violates a statute cannot rely upon the presumption that others . . . will not disobey the law." Pfeifer v. Yellow Cab Co., 88 Ga. App. 221
, 225 (76 SE2d 225
). Whether the alleged negligence of the defendant Medlin caused or contributed with negligence of another defendant to cause the plaintiff's injuries is a jury question. " 'If the character of the intervening act claimed to break the connection between the original wrongful act and the subsequent injury was such that its probable or natural consequence could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrongdoer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrongdoer is responsible for all of the consequences resulting from the intervening act.' " Anderson-McGriff Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 58
, 67-68 (68 SE2d 377
); Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327
, 337 (26 SE2d 698
); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Mills, 78 Ga. App. 690
, 696 (51 SE2d 705
). The case of Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Spears, 212 Ga. 537 (93 SE2d 659)
is not applicable for the reason that the Supreme Court there held that the physical facts alleged affirmatively showed that the alleged negligent location of a telephone pole was not the proximate cause of the collision.
The trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer of the defendant Medlin.
2. Where there is any evidence to support the verdict of a jury approved by the trial court, this court is without authority to reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the motion for new trial on the usual general grounds. Grannemann v. Salley, 95 Ga. App. 778
, 781 (99 SE2d 338
). In this case there was an evidentiary basis for the verdict against the defendant Medlin, and the trial court did not err in overruling the general grounds of her motion for new trial, in overruling the special ground of her motion for new trial complaining of the court's refusal to grant her motion for directed verdict, and in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Echols v. Thompson, 211 Ga. 299 (85 SE2d 423)
. Since in considering the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict and to enter a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict this court has determined that the verdict was not contrary to the evidence, we can not consider the special ground of the motion for new trial complaining of the denial of the defendant's motion for nonsuit. Echols v. Thompson, supra.
3. Since there will be a judgment of affirmance and the case will not be tried again, the cross-bill will not be considered. Robinson v. Georgia Savings Bank &c. Co., 185 Ga. 688, 700 (196 SE 395); Weatherly v. Parr, 74 Ga. App. 526, 531 (40 SE2d 445).
Judgment affirmed on main bill of exceptions; cross-bill dismissed. Felton, C. J., and Bell, J., concur.