We granted certiorari in these cases, 149 Ga. App. 284 (254 SE2d 401) (1979)
, in order to re-evaluate our decision in Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58
, 60 (195 SE2d 399
) (1973), where we adopted the Illinois Rule of long arm jurisdiction "based on the premise that the Long Arm Statute contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process." We reaffirm that decision.
Code Ann. 24-113.1 (b) and (c) 1
provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasors. Prior to the adoption of subsection (c), the Court of Appeals had interpreted subsection (b) restrictively, requiring that both the tortious act and the injury must occur in Georgia to confer personal jurisdiction of our courts over the defendant. Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 124 Ga. App. 694 (185 SE2d 557) (1971)
; O'Neal Steel v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106 (169 SE2d 827) (1969)
. In response, the legislature enacted subsection (c), Ga. L. 1970, p. 433, and this court disapproved of the Court of Appeals' narrow construction of (b) in Coe & Payne, supra. 2
There, we held that "subsection (c) . . . was obviously enacted to legislatively 'get around' the legal reasoning on which the decisions in O'Neal Steel v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106 (169 SE2d 827)
 and Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 124 Ga. App. 694 (185 SE2d 557)
 were based." Coe & Payne, supra, p. 59. The General Assembly apparently approves of this interpretation of legislative intent for it has not again acted to amend these subsections.
Furthermore, we note that limitations similar to those present in subsection (c) are constitutionally mandated under subsection (b). A nonresident defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts only if he has established "minimum contacts" in this state so that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with " 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " International
character arising from the act; or (c) Commits a tortious injury in this State caused by an act or omission outside this State, if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State; . . ." Code Ann. 24-113.1 (b) (c).
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945). Accord, Timberland Equipment Ltd. v. Jones, 146 Ga. App. 589 (246 SE2d 709) (1978)
(cert. den. ); Jet America v. Gates Learjet Corp., 145 Ga. App. 258 (243 SE2d 584) (1978)
, revd. on other grounds, 242 Ga. 307 (248 SE2d 676) (1978)
; Value Engineering Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44 (230 SE2d 29) (1976)
(cert. den.); Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399
(227 SE2d 266
) (1976) (cert. den.); Shearouse v. Paul Miller Ford Co., 127 Ga. App. 639 (194 SE2d 585) (1972)
. We thus conclude that there is no essential difference between subsections (b) and (c). The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident third-party defendant is affirmed. See Value Engineering Co. v. Gisell, supra.
Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Sidney F. Wheeler, Ben S. Williams, for appellee (Case No. 34973).